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COUNSELING MEXICAN
EXPORTERS TO THE UNITED
STATES*
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr.**
I. EL DERECHO AJENO
On 21 March 1806, in the village of San Pablo Guelatao, was
born one of the greatest statesmen of our hemisphere. From his
parents, who died when he was three years old, he learned a powerful
truth. They taught it to him in Zapotec: "La hrappa tizhaa tanga
que bene6 tan gaana l4 a llaagna." When he was twelve he began
to learn Spanish, and proudly translated his powerful truth into a
sentence that has coalesced with his memory: "El respeto al derecho
ajeno es la paz.'
"Peace is respect for the rights of others." That is the way we
usually express, in our language, the powerful truth of Benito Judrez.
But it has also another, simpler meaning. The Real Academia tells
us that respeto means not only "respect" but "consideration," that
derecho is also "law," ajeno means "far away," and paz can be
rendered as "tranquility." It does little violence to Judrez's sentence
to say: "Peace of mind comes from paying attention to the foreign
law . "
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In this article the citation "Checklist" is to Murphy, Structuring Mexican Exports to the
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which immediately follows this article.
1. The anecdote and Zapotecan equivalent are from GmusAN AnciNmoAs, AmRICA IN
EuRoPE 161.
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That rendering of Judrez's truth is the golden rule for counseling
Mexican exporters to the United States. Superficially such a rule
seems unnecessary. Those Mexican exporters are sophisticated men
and women, thoroughly acquainted with the North American world,
who drive General Motors, dress Brooks Brothers, and vacation
Disneyland as naturally as their Yankee colleagues. Films and tele-
vision have saturated their minds, like ours, with the lifestyle pro-
jections of Hollywood and Madison Avenue. The exporters are
therefore incredulous when their U.S. lawyer suggests that they have
more to learn about U.S. culture.
Nevertheless, the superficial similarities in style and taste between
Mexico and the United States mask profound cultural differences
that are powerfully replicated in their brusquely incongruous legal
systems. Therefore, the only way for the Mexican exporter to achieve
peace of mind is to pay careful attention to the derecho ajeno-in
particular, to six adamant aspects of foreign law in the export market
of the United States. Three of those aspects are similar to what the
exporter's Mexican business environment taught him to expect. The
other three are so dissimilar as to constitute fierce cultural shocks.
11. LITiGIousNEss
The fiercest cultural shock the Mexican exporter encounters in the
U.S. market is its sheer litigiousness. That characteristic of U.S..
society has grown, in two centuries, from a quaint rambunctiousness
to an immense social and economic malaise. Ninety percent of all
civil jury cases in the world are tried in the United States; we spend
$30 billion dollars a year just suing each other.2 Between 1975 and
1985, U.S. liability awards in general rose 401%, and the number of
product liability cases before our federal courts increased by 1,000%.'
Mexico is not like that. In Mexico civil actions do not go to juries,
liability awards are typically for trifling sums, and, most significantly,
serious public issues are resolved, not by litigation, but by political
pressure and economic clout. Therefore, the export executive is
unprepared for the hair-trigger resort to litigation and the devastating
jury awards of the United States.
Anticipating and defending against those risks is a principal ob-
jective of the export structure-the interrelated configuration of
2. Address by L. A. Iacocca to the American Bar Association, San Francisco, California,
at 9 (August 10, 1987).
3. Id.
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corporations and contracts by which the Mexican enterprise achieves
its presence in the U.S. market. 4 Essentially the structure's strategy
is to wall off the main Mexican enterprise from involvement in the
United States. Thus, the manufacturing source of the product and
its facilities for distribution in Mexico continue to function in-and
only in-Mexico. Operations in the United States are restricted to a
separate subsidiary corporation whose function is to limit the liability
of the manufacturing parent to the resources it has invested in that
subsidiary.
The manufacturing parent and its export subsidiary are related
only by share ownership and by contracts consistent with their roles.
Thus, the parent contracts- to supply the subsidiary, in Mexico, with
export products; the subsidiary exports the products, warehouses
them as needed in the United States, and resells them to distributors,
dealers or consumers, directly or through consignees.
Among the guidelines to consider in planning such an export
structure are the jurisdictional laws of the states in which the export
subsidiary will resell. A broadly inclusive example is the Texas Long-
Arm Statute,5 which subjects to suit in Texas any foreign corporation
that (1) "contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and
either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this
state," (2) "commits a tort in whole or in part in this state," or (3)
"recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located
in Texas, for employment inside or outside this state." To the extent
possible only the export subsidiary, and not the manufacturing par-
ent, is allowed to. engage in any activity that could be caught in
those jurisdictional jaws.
In the few reported cases that dealt with foreign corporate exporters
to Texas, preliminary sales operations and spot intrastate sales of
detained goods, but not export sales made by sporadic local sales
solicitation, were held sufficient to support local jurisdiction. Cases
that sustained local jurisdiction in the analogous situation of interstate
sales to Texas have considered it jurisdictionally sufficient for the
seller to maintain a sales representative in Texas, negotiate or con-
clude sale contracts in Texas, or perform sales-related functions in
Texas. Mere interstate delivery, however, is traditionally not enough.
4. Discussed in Checklist § 1(a).
5. Cited and discussed in Checklist § 1(b).
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There are two other helpful resources for delineating the contrac-
tual perimeters between manufacturing parent and export subsidiary.
One is Incoterms, the International Chamber of Commerce's rules
for the interpretation of basic trade terms. The second is the Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. The adherence of
Mexico to the Convention is not effective until January 1, 1989, and
the adherence of the United States is subject to the reservation that
the Convention will not automatically apply, by rules of private
international law, between a U.S. resident and the resident of a non-
adhering nation. Nevertheless, the Convention may be incorporated
by reference in Mexico-U.S. contracts or usefully consulted as a
check-list for their provisions.
When disputes cannot be avoided, they can at least be diverted to
modes of confrontation less problematical than lawsuits at unexpected
venues. This is one of the rare problem areas in which there is a
helpful treaty relationship between Mexico and the United States.
Both nations adhere to the U.N. Arbitration Convention of 1958,
and thus are reciprocally obliged to enforce agreements to arbitrate
and to recognize arbitration awards. This permits the export subsid-
iary to require, by carefully drawn arbitration clauses, that disputes
arising under its commercial contracts be resolved exclusively by
arbitration.
In the sober aftermath of Bhopal we realize, of course, that some
liabilities will pierce the most meticulously constructed corporate and
contractual veils. The most ruthlessly penetrating is product liability. 6
Against it, the only safe precaution is for the export subsidiary to
obtain, or require its distributors to obtain, product liability insurance
that protects both the export subsidiary and its Mexican manufac-
turing parent.
The principal product liability guidelines are two recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), permitted product liability juris-
diction to be asserted over any foreign exporters that delivered their
products into the "stream of commerce" with the awareness that
they would be purchased by consumers in the forum state. Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct.
1026 (1987), shields from that rule component manufacturers who
sell to primary manufacturers abroad. For direct exporters, however,
6. Discussed in Checklist § 1(c).
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insurance is the only reliable precaution against U.S. product liability
claims.
III. STATES' RIGHTOUSNESS
The second cultural shock the Mexican exporter encounters in the
U.S. market is states' rights.
To the exporter's U.S. counsel, those words "states' rights" are
mere echoes of an antebellum past-political words, to be declaimed
on San Jacinto Day or snarled in Judge Bork's confirmation hearings,
but not legal words, fit for LEXIS, registration statements, closing
opinions, and the like. In counsel's jaundiced eyes the interstate
commerce clause and a vigorous federal judiciary have well nigh
emasculated the Tenth Amendment, making of the United States,
for business purposes, a unitary nation. But to the Mexican exporter
it seems otherwise. He planned to introduce his product into one
foreign nation, but to his astonishment he finds that he confronts
fifty-one of them: fifty corporation laws; fifty Certificate of Au-
thority statutes; fifty franchise taxes; fifty state legislatures, judici-
aries, and executives; and, to make it even more forbidding, a fifty-
first wall of federal taxes, laws, and government surrounding all the
rest.
Mexico, by contrast, is a highly centralized nation. Its constituti6n
is labeled "federal" but there the federalism ends: one corporation
law, one law for the establishment of foreign enterprise, central
control of most taxes, and an honored tradition of national domi-
nation of the nominally separate states. Small wonder the exporters
are stunned by the diffused and discordant system of state authority
they encounter north of the Rio Grande.
To address their consternation, the best technique is to see the
United States through the eyes of the Mexican exporters-as fifty
different markets, planning carefully in advance, in terms of com-
pliance with key state laws, which of the fifty the exported product
will enter. Abgent special licensing requirements, those key state laws
are, essentially, Certificate of Authority laws, franchise taxes, and
taxes generally.
The Texas Certificate of Authority law,7 for example, allows the
export subsidiary to own local bank accounts; to sell in Texas through
"independent contractors"; to create, receive, and collect debts; to
7. Cited and discussed in Checklist § 4(a).
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transact business in interstate commerce; and to conduct "isolated
transactions"-all without obtaining a Certificate of Authority to
"transact business" in Texas. Cases applying those principles confirm
that no Certificate of Authority is required to sell into Texas by
interstate shipment on the basis of purchase orders obtained in Texas
but accepted outside. Consignment sales in Texas by out-of-state
consignors are similarly held to be exempt.
Historically, the Texas franchise tax system" has been nearly as
indulgent. The statute simply says that franchise taxes must be paid
by any corporation that has a Texas Certificate of Authority or
"does business" in Texas. The published franchise tax rulings hold
that interstate commerce sales into Texas do not constitute "doing
business" provided they are not obtained by consignment or regular
solicitation within the state. But the Rules promulgated by the
Comptroller General are tighter. They say that "performing a con-
tract in Texas" or "having employees, independent contractors,
agents or other representatives in Texas" who "provide or induce
sales of the foreign corporation's goods or services" is enough. Most
sweeping of all is the Rule of "constitutional nexus," which became
effective in 1986. It provides that, "A corporation is doing business
in Texas, for purposes of [franchise tax], when it has constitutional
nexus with Texas for the purpose of franchise taxation." The result
is to extend asserted franchise tax jurisdiction over Mexican exporters
to the very limit allowed states by the U.S. Constitution.
Regarding the movement of goods, that limit was drawn by the
U.S. Supreme Court's "original package" cases (Brown v. Maryland
and Low v. Austin) as refined by Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
and Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.9 Those decisions
exempt from state taxation a vehicle or instrumentality of foreign
commerce, but allow a state to impose a non-discriminatory tax on
goods-imported or domestic-that have come to rest in a warehouse
within the state.
As to international operations generally, a broad view of state
taxing authority was taken in the "'unitary tax" decisions of the
United States Supreme Court-Bass, Mobil, and most recently the
Container Corporation case 1-but the outrage of foreign exporters
and investors persuaded states not to impose "unitary tax" to that
8. Cited and discussed in Checklist § 4(b).
9. Cited and discussed in Checklist § 4(c).
10. Cited and discussed in Checklist § 4(d).
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authority's full extent. The dozen "unitary tax" states dwindled to
three. Consequently, "unitary tax" is one states' rights monster the
Mexican exporter has diminishing reason to fear.
IV. Tim GHosT oF ADAm SMI=
There is a third culture shock of the derecho ajeno-the foreign
law of the United States-which to the Mexican exporter is the most
alien of all. It is the ghost of Adam Smith. A fundamental stage
direction of the U.S. legal drama is the rule that its commercial
actors should behave like freely-competing, profit-motivated, private-
enterprising characters from The Wealth of Nations.
It is ironic that the world's largest market should thus ordain a
cultural attitude so incongruous to the business habits of most of
the remainder of the world. With the rules of the game in the
Mexican market, the contrast is especially stark. There, state enter-
prise is supreme, state intervention is the norm, and the few means
of production that have remained in private hands enjoy monopolies
and oligopolies that would make Adam Smith blush to the roots of
his powdered periwig.
Hence the dismay on Mexican exporters' faces when they learn
that, north of the Rio Grande, they must play by the strange Yankee
rules of competitive free enterprise. They confront those rules, prin-
cipally, in three areas.
One is the federal antitrust laws.' Exports to the United States
are covered, directly or indirectly, by the basic provisions of the
Sherman Act regarding combinations, the Federal Trade Commission
Act regarding unfair competition, and the Clayton Act regarding
acquisitions. Exporters are explicitly addressed in the Wilson Tariff
Act regarding price-fixing in imported goods, and the Robinson-
Patman amendments to the Clayton Act regarding price discrimina-
tion and exclusive dealing. And once Mexican products have reached
the United States they are subject, like domestic products, to general
antitrust rules affecting exclusive distributorships, tying clauses, resale
price maintenance, and territorial and customer restrictions.
A second area in which the Mexican exporter confronts the free-
trade mandates of the U.S. market is antidumping. 2 Here the United
States imposes on the Mexican product an additional import duty
11. Cited and discussed in Checklist § 5(a). See also Checklist § 5(d) (Section 337 exclusion)
and § 5(e) (franchise and business opportunity laws).
12. Discussed in Checklist § 5(b).
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equal to the amount by which its value in the foreign market exceeds
its U.S. market price. The technicalities of that determination are
complicated, and the administrative procedures for assessing and
collecting the resulting duties are elaborate. The only saving grace is
that to impose antidumping duties, "material injury" to a U.S.
industry must be shown. For Mexican exporters to the United States,
the antidumping law is a serious challenge because in many product
lines decades of protected import substitution have resulted in Mex-
ican market prices higher than what the U.S. traffic will bear.
A third area of U.S. legislation haunted by the ghost of Adam
Smith is countervailing duties.' 3 Here the law assesses penalty duties,
not to offset lower prices, but to compensate for government subsidies
from which the product benefited in its country of origin. This law
bears heavily on Mexican exports because of the high degree of
intervention by the Mexican government in all segments of the
Mexican economy. Fortunately for the Mexican exporter, a 1985
agreement between Mexico and the United States places Mexican
products within the protected category against which U.S. counter-
vailing duties may not be assessed unless the claimant also proves
"material injury" to a U.S. industry.
Any one of those three haunts of Adam Smith-antitrust, antid-
umtping, and countervailing duties-is sufficient to bankrupt an ex-
port enterprise that depends upon the market distortions it forbids.
Against that fate the only practical strategy of the Mexican exporter
is to analyze, candidly and in advance, the extent to which the export
venture will depend upon practices or subsidies those laws oppose.
If the project relies upon a trade distortion that is likely to be
successfully challenged under the antitrust laws, it is better never
initiated. If the project's implementation is vulnerable to antidumping
or countervailing duties, those duties and the adversarial cost of their
being imposed must be budgeted into the project. In many cases an
export structUre that does not attract such penalties can be devised.
V. FAmiLkR FOES
Not all of the legal problems of the U.S. market are cultural
shocks to the Mexican exporter. There are three familiar foes.
For example, there is federal income taxation. To the extent it is
unfamiliar, that unfamiliarity is due not to any conceptual difference
13. Discussed in Checklist § 5(c).
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between Mexico and the United States on the subject of income
taxes, but to the radical changes wrought by the U.S. Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
In the first place, the 1986 Act so reduced U.S. income tax rates
that, compared to Mexico, the United States is now a low tax
jurisdiction.1 4 That means that today's tax-structuring of Mexican
exports to the United States must be more sophisticated than merely
shifting profit-centers from the United States to Mexico.
More fundamentally, the "dividend equivalent tax" initiated by
the 1986 Act has reversed the structural rule-of-thumb for Mexican
export operations in the United States. Previously, when the United
States had a thirty perceit tax on dividends paid abroad but no
corresponding tax on the remittance of branch profits, the best
corporate structure for investors (like Mexicans) unprotected by a
general tax treaty with the United States was usually the U.S. branch
of a non-U.S. corporation. Given the "dividend equivalent tax" of
the 1986 Act, for investors without treaty protection there is now,
in effect, a thirty percent annual tax on remittable branch profits.
Consequently, the standard tax-favored structure for a Mexican ex-
port distribution operation in the United States has become a U.S.
corporation. 5
The second element of the U.S. legal ldndscape familiar to the
Mexican exporter is trademarks. 6 Unfortunately they are so familiar
that sometimes they are ignored. Many a Mexican export project has
foundered on failure to establish in advance proprietary name-iden-
tification of the export product in the United States.
For Mexican exporters, the third familiar element of U.S. law is
that traditional hobgoblin of transnational traders, Ia aduana. As a
checkpoint and duty-exacter, Customs functions in the United States
much as in other countries. To cope with it, the exporters' best
technique is to shadow-box their entries in advance with an experi-
enced customs broker, making mock-ups of their intended shipping
documents and seeking the product classification that produces the
lowest duty. 7 Besides import duties, Customs also enforces a myriad
14. Discussed in Checklist § 3(d).
15. The elements of such structures are discussed in Checklist § 3(a) (the absence of a
general Mexico-U.S. tax treaty), § 3(b) (U.S. statutory tax-liability for export income), and §
3(c) (the "dividend equivalent" tax).
16. Discussed in Checklist § 2.
17. Those classifications changed in January 1988 when the Harmonized Code replaced
the venerable U.S. Tariff Schedule as the classification key.
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of exclusionary laws, from the required country-of-origin markings
to anti-pirating and the massive remedies of Section 337 against
"unfair" imports. 8
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPORTS
Counseling the Mexican exporter to the United States consists,
therefore, of addressing, from the unique perspective of the exporter's
needs, the six areas of the derecho ajeno-the foreign law of the
United States-that the exporter confronts: to his eyes, the unsur-
prising confrontations of income taxes, trademarks, and customs;
and the surprising confrontations of liability-insulation, state business
regulations, and the free-market rules of antitrust, countervailing
duties, and antidumping. Taken by itself each of those areas is an
isolated legal problem, but solving them all creates a broadly-con-
ceived export program whose significance is much greater than the
sum of its parts.
In the same measure, the export sales such a program can achieve
have a significance much greater than the black numbers they add
to the Mexican exporter's earnings statement. We live in an age
where powerful forces of history are striving to make of North
America, if not a common market, at least a continent of mutually
supportive economies. Mexico's decision to join GATT was a giant
step in that direction. 19 The free-trade agreement between Canada
and the United States, 20 and the trade and investment discussions
between Mexico and the United States, 2' are encouraging indications
18. Discussed in Checklist § 6.
19. On August 24, 1986, Mexico became the 92nd member of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Its accession protocol undertook to eliminate the import licensing system,
reduce certain tariffs, and phase out official import prices as a basis for tariff rates. See 3
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 977 (July 30, 1986).
20. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was signed on January 2, 1988. If approved
by the U.S. Congress and the Canadian Parliament it will, among other matters, (1) eliminate,
over ten years, all tariffs between the two nations, (2) raise, over four years, "threshold"(restricted) levels of U.S. investment in Canada to Can. $150,000,000 per transaction, and
eliminate completely "threshold" levels of indirect U.S. investment in Canada, and (3) improve
reciprocal access for services and energy, agricultural and automotive products. The objectives
and negotiating procedures of the Agreement are discussed in Business America, October 28,
1987, at 2.
21. On November 6, 1987 the United States and Mexico signed a "framework agreement"
that obligates each nation, within 30 days after a request from the other, to consult on any
issue between them related to trade or investment. Scheduled for discussion within the first 90
days were sectoral issues involving textiles, agricultural products, steel products, foreign
investment, intellectual property, and electronic products. The text of the agreement is repro-
duced in 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1410 (November 11, 1987).
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of similar momentum. The durable institution of maquila is a prac-
tical example of pragmatic cooperation to the same end. By estab-
lishing a Mexican economic presence within the rapidly integrating
market of our continent, the Mexican exporter not only increases
Mexico's share of that market but also adds multinational stability
to the new economic reality of a commercially interrelated North
America.

